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This paper studies English reverse auctions within a uniﬁed framework for preference-
based English reverse auctions. In this context, and particularly for electronic auctions,
representing and handling the buyer’s preferences, so as to enable him/her to obtain the
best possible outcome, is a major issue. Existing auction mechanisms, which are based
on single or multi-attribute utility functions, are only able to represent transitive and
complete preferences. It is well known, however, in the preference modeling literature that
more general preference structures, allowing intransitivity and incomparability, are more
appropriate to capture preferences. On the other hand, we must also consider properties
on the evolution and, above all, on the outcome of any auction executed by an auction
mechanism. These properties, as well as properties of non-dominance and fair competition
deﬁned for multiple criteria auctions, impose restrictions on the preference relation. This
leaves room for interesting preference models to be implemented within English reverse
auction mechanisms.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The automation of auctions over the web has been raising new research perspectives, ranging across various domains
such as auction theory [12,21], agent technology [19,22,35,36], and decision theory [5,15,25,32]. An auction is a competitive
mechanism to allocate resources to a buyer based on predeﬁned rules. These rules deﬁne the bidding process, how the
winner is determined, and the ﬁnal agreement. Software agents are increasingly being used to represent humans in elec-
tronic auctions [1,4,14,18–20,23,35]. These agents can systematically conduct a wide variety of auctions, on behalf of buyers,
mediators, or sellers, and can make rapid decisions about bid selection, winner determination, or bid submission.
The four basic auction protocols are English, Dutch, ﬁrst-price, and second-price or Vickrey (see, e.g., [21]). The reverse
version of these protocols, used in e-procurement markets, is when a buyer plays the role of the auctioneer, whereas
sellers play the role of bidders. Among these, the English reverse auction protocol is the most popular one for procurement
processes. In this paper we focus on the English reverse auction protocol. The price-only English reverse auction protocol,
which is prevailing, is an iterative process with a deadline, where sellers compete on the price in order to sell a single item
to a unique buyer [11,21]. The buyer speciﬁes the opening bid price and a bid decrement. At each round, each seller may
overbid by proposing a bid which is cheaper than the current best bid by at least the bid decrement. The auction stops
with the current best bid and the corresponding seller when no other seller can overbid. Multi-attribute auctions represent
an extension to standard auction theory [7,27]. They allow negotiating on multiple attributes, involving not only the price,
but also other attributes such as quality, delivery terms and conditions. The buyers reveal their preferences on the item to
be purchased and sellers compete both on price and non-price attributes to win the contract. The multi-attribute English
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13,34]. In particular, it has been adopted oﬃcially by the European Community through directives on public procurement
whose stated objectives are to decrease contracting costs, increase transparency and achieve better economic outcomes as
a result of increased competition [10,30].
A crucial issue in the design of multi-attribute auctions is the way of modeling and exploiting the buyer’s preferences
so as to ensure the best possible outcome for the buyer. Multi-attribute auction mechanisms proposed in the literature are
often based on a linear or quasi-linear utility function representing the buyer’s preferences. Che [9] ﬁrst introduced ﬁrst-
price and second-price auction mechanisms for two-dimensional reverse auctions in which suppliers bid on both price and
quality. Then, David et al. [13,14] extended Che’s work to an arbitrary number of attributes; they also designed an English
reverse auction protocol for the general case of multi-attribute auctions. Still in the context of iterative reverse auctions,
Parkes and Kalagnanam [28] designed an auction mechanism, where sellers are iteratively required to set a price for each
attribute value. Engel and Wellman [16] extended this work considering dependencies among attributes. Other approaches
are based on the explicit construction of criteria. Bichler [6] implemented and experimented multi-attribute auctions in a
market place, where criterion values are aggregated using a weighted sum. As an alternative to the weighted sum, Bellosta
et al. proposed a multiple criteria English reverse auction mechanism based on reference points [3,4], where the buyer’s
preferences and relative importance of criteria are not expressed in terms of weights, but more directly in terms of required
values on the criteria.
All the above-mentioned auction mechanisms are based on a value or scoring function, which amounts to considering
that the preference relation is transitive and complete. However, as well known in the literature on preference modeling,
imposing these properties is questionable when aiming to represent preferences. Indeed, transitivity of indifference is of-
ten contradicted in practice. This occurs, in particular, when slight differences between two alternatives are not deemed
signiﬁcant and give rise to an indifference between these alternatives. In this case, a chain of such indifferences may cor-
respond to a large difference between the ﬁrst and last alternatives of this chain, leading to a preference for one over the
other (see, e.g., [24]). Even for strict preference, one may observe intransitivities [26,33], particularly when preferences are
multidimensional. Moreover, it is sometimes relevant to model preferences using incomparability, e.g. when the objects to
be compared have strongly conﬂicting evaluations [29]. Consider for instance a buyer willing to purchase a car on the basis
of two criteria, price and speed. This buyer may not wish to compare a fast but expensive car to a cheap but slow car,
above all if he/she is interested in cars with medium price and speed. In the speciﬁc context of multiple criteria auctions,
De Smet [15] also suggested considering incomparability situations when bids to be compared are quite different. For these
reasons, we assume in this paper that the buyer’s preferences are represented by a binary preference relation which is not
necessarily transitive and complete.
We must take into account, however, that we are representing preferences in the context of auctions for which we
should also consider some natural properties regarding the evolution and, above all, the ﬁnal result of the auction. This
last point refers to the issue of eﬃciency of the auction [38]. In this paper, we study the impact of intransitivity and/or
incomparability on these properties and identify minimal conditions on the buyer’s preference relation which ensure such
properties.
Moreover, since many auction mechanisms are based on multidimensional preferences, we also focus on the case where
the buyer’s preference relation results from the aggregation of several criteria. In this context, additional properties in terms
of non-dominance of the winning bid and fair competition between non-dominated bids should be satisﬁed. Such properties are
commonly used in multiple criteria decision analysis [37] to characterize a decision procedure:
• Non-dominance requires that a decision procedure selects a non-dominated alternative, i.e. an alternative such that any
other alternative which is better on one criterion, is worse on another criterion.
• Fair competition is satisﬁed by a decision procedure if for any non-dominated alternative there exists at least one set of
values of the aggregation model parameters which enables the procedure to select the alternative.
In the context of preference-based English reverse auctions, we need to adapt these properties taking into account the
fact that an auction is an iterative process where bids are progressively available. Moreover, a given potential bid is not
necessarily proposed during an auction since this depends on each seller strategy and on the pressure of the competition
between sellers. We investigate, here again, minimal conditions on the buyer’s preference relation which ensure satisfaction
of these properties. Considering these conditions, typical classes of preference relations are evaluated and discussed.
The main contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we propose a conceptual framework, called PERA (Preference-
based English Reverse Auctions), for designing preference-based English reverse auctions within which buyer’s preferences
are represented by a binary preference relation. The basic purpose of this framework is to study all the auction mechanisms
in a uniﬁed way. This framework can take into account price-only and existing multi-attribute auctions mechanisms, as well
as mechanisms based on more general preference relations, relaxing transitivity and completeness. Second, we focus on
mechanisms which involve preference relations resulting from the aggregation of multiple criteria. The framework allows us
to analyze them according to two fundamental properties (non-dominance of the winning bid and fair competition between
bids). Since most classical auction mechanisms do not satisfy both properties, we show how to design mechanisms which
satisfy them. Finally, this framework integrates a generic algorithm that allows a buyer agent to manage English reverse
auctions providing bid evaluation, bid selection and request formulation.
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which supports the execution of preference-based English reverse auctions, both in asynchronous and synchronous modes.
Section 3 identiﬁes and investigates properties related to the improving nature and eﬃciency of auctions executed by PERA.
A specialization of PERA, called MERA, in the case where preferences result from the aggregation of the multiple criteria is
introduced in Section 4. Properties of non-dominance of the winning bid and fair competition between non-dominated bids
are introduced and studied respectively in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 shows how to design auction mechanisms ensuring
these properties and provides a detailed illustrative example. Conclusions are provided in a ﬁnal section.
2. Framework PERA
Framework PERA integrates a generic algorithm that allows a buyer agent to manage Preference-based English reverse
auctions. In this section, we present this algorithm and show how it can be customized for asynchronous and synchronous
auctions. Finally, we deﬁne the notion of a PERA mechanism.
We ﬁrst introduce the following notations.
• B , the set of potential bids, where any bid is characterized by a vector of attribute values.
• Bs , the set of potential bids of seller s.
• B−s , the set of potential bids of all sellers except seller s.
• P i , the set of bids received at round i.
• P i , the set of bids received until round i: P i =⋃ij=1 P j .• P , the set of bids received during the auction.
• , the preference relation deﬁned on B that models the buyer’s preferences on the item to be purchased. Three basic
relations can be deﬁned from :
◦ a strict preference relation , corresponding to the asymmetric part of , where a  b if and only if a  b and
¬(b  a),
◦ an indifference relation ∼, corresponding to the symmetric part of , where a ∼ b if and only if a b and b  a,
◦ an incomparability relation ?, where a?b if and only if ¬(a b) and ¬(b a).
• Given two binary relations R and S deﬁned on B , R⊂ S is equivalent to aRb ⇒ aSb.
2.1. Algorithm PERA
Algorithm PERA, described in Algorithm 1, generalizes the price-only English reverse auction algorithm in two ways:
• The price criterion, used to compare bids, is replaced by the buyer’s preference relation .
• The beat-the-quote rule [38], requiring that a new bid has a lower price than the current best bid by a given decrement,
is generalized taking into account a relation r deﬁned on B , called the request relation. Relation r is asymmetric and
stronger than relation , that is such that r ⊂ . Thus, the generalized rule requires that a new bid must be r-
preferred to the current best bid.
The main assumptions of algorithm PERA are:
• Each auction deals with a single unit of an item, a ﬁxed set of sellers, and has a ﬁxed deadline.
• Each seller proposes at most one bid at each round.
• The seller who proposed the best bid at the current round is not called upon for the next round.
• At any round, if none of the called upon sellers has provided a bid before the round time limit then none of them owns
a bid satisfying the request constraint.
Algorithm 1 PERA(,r )
1: Announce to the sellers requirements on the item to be purchased, the round time limit, and the closing time
2: best0 ← nil
3: i ← 1
4: repeat
5: Collect the set of valid bids Pi until the round time limit is reached
6: if Pi 	= ∅ then
7: Select the current best bid: besti ← select(, P i)
8: Compute the new request constraint: ci ← request(r ,besti)
9: Announce the new request ci to the sellers
10: i ← i + 1
11: end if
12: until (Pi = ∅) or (t > closing time)
13: b∗← besti−1
14: return b∗
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the round time limit, and the closing time. The buyer collects the set of bids until the round time limit is reached. When
the set of bids proposed during the current round is not empty, the buyer selects the current best bid as the reference bid
and formulates feedback information for the next round. Feedback information consists of a request constraint that forces
any new bid to beat the current best bid. The auction ends either when no bid has been proposed within the round time
or when the closing time is reached. In the ﬁrst case, the auction is said to end naturally. At the end of the auction, the
current best bid becomes the winning bid.
Selection of the current best bid (step 7 of Algorithm 1). The current best bid is selected applying a function called select
which takes as arguments a preference relation  and a non-empty set X of bids, and returns one bid from set X :
select(, X) ∈ X
This function is deﬁned precisely according to the synchronization mode.
Deﬁnition of the request constraint (step 8 of Algorithm 1). The request constraint is deﬁned applying a function called
request which takes as arguments a request relation r and a bid a, and returns a constraint imposing that bids should be
r-preferred to bid a:
request(r,a)(b) ⇔ b r a
At each round i  1, the request constraint ci = request(r,besti) asks for bids that are r-preferred to the current best bid
besti . The bids that satisfy the request constraint ci are said to be valid.
Owing to the deﬁnition of the request constraint, we get the following remarks.
Remark 1. In any PERA auction where the request relation r is transitive, any seller unable to satisfy the current request
constraint at round i, is unable to satisfy further request constraints, unlike where the request relation r is intransitive.
Remark 2. In any PERA auction, we have besti+1 r besti , for i  1.
This remark provides an obvious necessary and suﬃcient condition in order to prevent cycling in the algorithm.
Proposition 1. Algorithm PERA(,r) does not cycle if and only if relation r is acyclic.
As a consequence, we impose that relation r used in algorithm PERA(,r) is acyclic.
In the next two subsections, we introduce two specialized versions of algorithm PERA called respectively asynchronous-
PERA and synchronous-PERA.
2.2. Asynchronous PERA auctions
Asynchronous English reverse auctions often occur in the context of real-time bid submissions and are largely used in
sourcing of heterogeneous goods and services [2,14,31,34].
In an asynchronous PERA auction, any seller may propose a valid bid at any moment before the closing time is reached.
The round time limit is reached as soon as one bid is received. Thus, at each round, the buyer collects only one bid.
Therefore, function select merely consists of returning this element as the current best bid.
The following remark outlines the behavior of any asynchronous PERA auction.
Remark 3. In any asynchronous PERA auction, we have P i = {besti} and P i = {best1, . . . ,besti}, for i  1.
2.3. Synchronous PERA auctions
Synchronous English reverse auctions often occur in the context of sealed bid auctions where each seller proposes his/her
bid without knowing the bids of the other sellers. They are recommended in government procurement procedures [10,30]
because they ensure fair competition between sellers.
At each round of a synchronous PERA auction, each seller either sends one valid bid before the round time limit or
informs that he/she does not participate at this round. The buyer collects the set of bids proposed by the sellers and selects
the current best bid as the reference bid. Therefore, function select is deﬁned as follows.
Given a preference relation  and a non-empty set of bids X , function select selects arbitrarily any element in the set of
maximal elements of X :
select(, X) ∈ M(, X) = {b ∈ X ∣∣ ∀b′ ∈ X,¬(b′  b)}
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any non-empty set X . Thus, we impose that relation  is acyclic to ensure that function select always returns one bid in
any non-empty set of bids.
2.4. PERAmechanisms
Various mechanisms can be deﬁned as restrictions of algorithm PERA by specifying a class of preference relations and a
class of request relations. A PERA mechanism, denoted by PERAP,r , is deﬁned by:
• P , a class of preference relations,
• r, a requestmapping function that associates to any preference relation ∈P a class of request relations denoted by r().
Depending on the synchronization mode, we get the following deﬁnition of a well-deﬁned mechanism.
Deﬁnition 1. A mechanism PERAP,r is well-deﬁned if and only if:
1. For any ∈P , any r ∈ r() is stronger than , i.e. such that r ⊂ .
2. For any ∈P , any r ∈ r() is acyclic.
3. In the synchronous mode, for any ∈P ,  is acyclic.
Condition 1 corresponds to the generalization of the beat-the-quote rule. Conditions 2 and 3 guarantee that algo-
rithm PERA does not cycle.
Considering that any transitive and complete relation deﬁned on a ﬁnite or countable set can be represented by a utility
(or value) function u (see, e.g., [17]), we introduce the following mechanism.
Example 1. Mechanism PERAPU ,rU , denoted by PERAU , is deﬁned by:
• PU , the class of preference relations  such that
a b ⇔ u(a) u(b)
where u denotes a utility (or value) function.
• rU (), the class of request relations r such that
a r b ⇔ a  b and u(a) u(b) + ε
where ε  0 is an increment on u.
Observe that when ε = 0, relation r coincides with , i.e. a r b if and only if u(a) > u(b) and when ε > 0, we get
a r b if and only if u(a) u(b) + ε. Choosing a request relation r ∈ r() amounts to setting an auction step ε. In this way
the beat-the-quote rule is directly satisﬁed.
Moreover, mechanism PERAU is well-deﬁned since it satisﬁes all the conditions of Deﬁnition 1.
In this section, we introduced framework PERA allowing the management of auctions while accepting general prefer-
ence relations not necessarily transitive and complete. The main restriction is acyclicity of the request relation r , for the
asynchronous mode, and acyclicity of the asymmetric part of the preference relation , for the synchronous mode.
3. Properties of PERA auctions
In this section, we ﬁrst study properties related to the evolution of PERA auctions. Finally, we investigate eﬃciency of
PERA auctions.
3.1. Evolution of PERA auctions
Evolution of reverse English auctions refers to properties which could be considered as the auction progresses [38,15].
The price-only English auction achieves its improving nature by requiring that a new bid be cheaper than the current best
bid. In PERA auctions, this property is generalized into three properties in order to take into account preference relations
which are not necessarily complete and transitive:
• [MBB] Maximality of the current best bid. At each round i  1, none of the bids received until round i is preferred to the
current best bid: besti ∈ M(, P i).
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best j , for j = 1, . . . , i − 1.
• [NCB] No cycling on bids. At each round i  2, any proposed bid has not been proposed previously: P i ∩ P i−1 = ∅.
For both synchronization modes, the only dependence between the above properties is:
Proposition 2. [MBB] ⇒ [NCB].
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that [NCB] is not satisﬁed. Then, there exists i  2 and b ∈ P i−1 such that b ∈ P i , i.e. such
that b r besti−1 and thus such that b  besti−1, since r ⊂ . This contradicts [MBB] for besti−1. 
The three above properties are trivially satisﬁed by any auction PERA(,r), when both relations  and r are transitive,
but might not be satisﬁed otherwise as shown in the illustrative example presented in Section 7 .
3.1.1. Evolution of asynchronous PERA auctions
We provide conditions on relations  and r so that asynchronous-PERA ensures satisfaction of properties [MBB], [IBB],
and [NCB]. First we give the following results.
Proposition 3. In any asynchronous PERA auction we have:
1. [IBB] ⇒ [MBB].
2. [NCB] is satisﬁed.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
Proposition 4. Algorithm asynchronous-PERA(,r) ensures:
• [MBB] if and only if
∀n 3, ∀b1, . . . ,bn ∈ B, b j+1 r b j, j = 1, . . . ,n − 1 ⇒ ¬
(
b1  bn) (1)
• [IBB] if and only if
∀n 3, ∀b1, . . . ,bn ∈ B, b j+1 r b j, j = 1, . . . ,n − 1 ⇒ bn  b1 (2)
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
As corollaries of Proposition 3, we provide now more interpretable suﬃcient conditions to ensure satisfaction of [MBB]
and [IBB].
Corollary 1. If  is acyclic then algorithm asynchronous-PERA(,r) ensures [MBB].
Proof. Since r ⊂ , b j+1 r b j implies b j+1  b j , j = 1, . . . ,n − 1. Acyclicity of  implies then ¬(b1  bn) and estab-
lishes (1) in Proposition 4. 
Corollary 2. If  is transitive or if r is transitive, then algorithm asynchronous-PERA(,r) ensures [MBB] and [IBB].
Proof. If  is transitive or if r is transitive, (2) in Proposition 4 is satisﬁed due to r ⊂ . Thus [IBB] is satisﬁed. From
Proposition 3, satisfaction of [IBB] implies satisfaction of [MBB]. 
3.1.2. Evolution of synchronous PERA auctions
We ﬁrst provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions on relations  and r so that synchronous-PERA ensures satisfaction
of properties [MBB], [IBB], and [NCB] for any auction it executes.
Proposition 5. Algorithm synchronous-PERA(,r) ensures:
• [MBB] if and only if
∀n 2, ∀a,b1, . . . ,bn ∈ B, ¬(a  b1) and b j+1 r b j, j = 1, . . . ,n − 1 ⇒ ¬(a  bn) (3)
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Suﬃcient conditions on  and r ensuring [MBB], [IBB], and [NCB].
[MBB] [IBB] [NCB]
Asynchronous-PERA
(minimal condition: r acyclic)
r acyclic – – 
 acyclic  – 
r transitive   
 transitive   
Synchronous-PERA
(minimal condition:  acyclic)
 acyclic – – –
r transitive –  
 transitive   
• [IBB] if and only if
∀n 3, ∀b1, . . . ,bn ∈ B, b j+1 r b j, j = 1, . . . ,n − 1 ⇒ bn  b1 (4)
• [NCB] if and only if
∀n 2, ∀a,b1, . . . ,bn ∈ B, ¬(a  b1) and b j+1 r b j, j = 1, . . . ,n − 1 ⇒ ¬(a r bn) (5)
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
As corollaries of the previous propositions, we provide now more interpretable suﬃcient conditions on relations  and
r to ensure satisfaction of [MBB], [IBB], and [NCB].
Corollary 3. If  is transitive then algorithm synchronous-PERA(,r) ensures [MBB], [IBB], and [NCB].
Proof. Observe that, since r ⊂ , b j+1 r b j implies b j+1  b j , j = 1, . . . ,n − 1. Then transitivity of  implies bn  b1.
This establishes (4) in Proposition 5, ensuring [IBB].
Using the same observation, for all a ∈ B , such that ¬(a  b1), bn  b1 and transitivity of  imply ¬(a  bn). This
establishes (3) in Proposition 5, ensuring [MBB]. Finally, from Proposition 2, [NCB] is also satisﬁed. 
Corollary 4. If r is transitive then algorithm synchronous-PERA(,r) ensures [IBB] and [NCB].
Proof. Observe that, by transitivity of r , b j+1 r b j , j = 1, . . . ,n− 1, implies bn r b1.
Then inclusion r ⊂  implies bn  b1 and this establishes (4) in Proposition 5, ensuring [IBB].
From inclusion r ⊂ , we get ¬(a  b1) implies ¬(a r b1). Moreover, using the initial observation, we get bn r b1.
Then, transitivity of r implies ¬(a r bn). This establishes (5) in Proposition 5, ensuring [NCB]. 
The above results, summarized in Table 1, allow us to draw some general conclusions. First, when  is transitive, the
three properties are satisﬁed for both synchronization modes. Therefore, classical auction mechanisms, which are based on
transitive and complete preference relations, do satisfy these properties. Nevertheless, this shows also that we can consider
auction mechanisms, handling non-transitive indifference or admitting incomparability, while preserving the three proper-
ties. Second, conditions to satisfy these properties are always stronger in the synchronous mode than in the asynchronous
mode.
3.2. Eﬃciency
Eﬃciency of a price-only auction requires that one of the bidders with the cheapest bid wins the auction. Equiva-
lently, none of the bidders, except maybe the winning bidder, can propose a bid cheaper than the winning bid. These
two deﬁnitions, although equivalent, generalize into two different formulations in the context of preference-based auc-
tions: eﬃciency requires ﬁrst that if one of the bidders can provide a bid strictly preferred to any other bid, then he/she
wins the auction, and second that none of the bidders, except may be the winning bidder, can propose a bid which is
strictly preferred to the winning bid. However, the use of a bid decrement ε in a price-only auction, does not ensure
eﬃciency but only a weaker form of eﬃciency within ε. In a preference-based auction, which uses a relation r to for-
mulate requests, eﬃciency is extended in order to take into account relation r instead of . This leads to the following
deﬁnition.
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• The winning bid b∗ , proposed by the winning seller s∗ is r-maximal in the set B−s∗: ∀b ∈ B−s∗ ,¬(b r b∗).
• If one of the sellers, s˜, owns at least one bid r-preferred to any potential bid in B−s˜ , then seller s˜ wins the auction.
Obviously, any form of eﬃciency cannot be ensured if the auction is stopped prematurely due to the closing time. There-
fore, such properties are meaningful only under the assumption that the auction ends naturally. We will not state the
assumption for the sake of brevity.
Proposition 6. Algorithm PERA ensures quasi eﬃciency.
Proof.
• The winning bid is such that no seller, except possibly the winning seller, can provide a bid that is r-preferred to the
winning bid.
• If one of the seller, s˜, owns one bid, bs˜ , r-preferred to any other bid, then he/she wins the auction. Indeed, if needed,
seller s˜ is always able to propose bs˜ to win the auction. 
One should notice that quasi eﬃciency is ensured without imposing any additional restriction on  or r . Actually, this
is an intrinsic property of algorithm PERA.
4. Multiple criteria English Reverse Auctions
From now on, we focus on auctions using preference relations resulting from the aggregation of multiple criteria. This
corresponds to situations where preferences regarding the item to be purchased are multidimensional and conﬂicting. In
the following, this speciﬁc class of PERA mechanisms is referred to as MERA (Multiple criteria English Reverse Auctions).
Some of these MERA mechanisms are based on a utility function which aggregates these criteria. In this case, the preference
relations are transitive and complete. However, we also consider MERA mechanisms which involve preference relations using
veto thresholds, which are not necessarily transitive and complete.
In this context, any bid b ∈ B is characterized by p criterion values (c1(b), . . . , cp(b)), where c j is a criterion function
that associates to any bid a value in domain C j ⊂ R such that for any b,b′ ∈ B , c j(b) c j(b′) implies that b is at least as
good as b′ for the buyer, regarding the viewpoint represented by criterion c j , j = 1, . . . , p. In the following, we denote for
simplicity b j = c j(b).
Let us now recall some common concepts and notations.
• C = C1 × · · · × Cp ⊂Rp , the criterion space.
• , the dominance relation deﬁned on B such that for any b,b′ ∈ B , bb′ if and only if b j  b′j , j = 1, . . . , p. We denote
by  the asymmetric part of , where bb′ if and only if bb′ and there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , p} such that b j > b′j .
A bid b ∈ X ⊂ B is non-dominated in X if and only if there is no b′ ∈ X such that b′b. Moreover, we assume that any
preference relation  deﬁned on B does not violate dominance, i.e. satisﬁes ⊂.
• Considering a function u :Rp →R, u is:
– monotonically increasing if and only if for any z, z′ ∈Rp , z j  z′j , j = 1, . . . , p, implies that u(z) u(z′),
– strongly monotonically increasing if and only if for any z, z′ ∈ Rp , z j  z′j , j = 1, . . . , p and z 	= z′ , implies that
u(z) > u(z′).
By reversing the previous inequality, we obtain deﬁnitions for monotonically decreasing and strongly monotonically
decreasing functions.
4.1. Multiple criteria English Reverse Auction mechanisms based on an aggregation function
Mechanism MERAPU ,rU , denoted by MERAU , is a PERAU mechanism based on a real aggregation function u deﬁned on Rp .
We illustrate now some particular MERAU mechanisms based on aggregation functions often used or proposed in prac-
tice: the weighted sum [10,6], reference point-based functions [4,3] and the lexicographic order [10].
Example 2. Mechanism MERAPΣ,rΣ , denoted by MERAΣ is a MERAU mechanism based on a weighted sum function uω ,
which is a strongly monotonically increasing function deﬁned as follows:
uω(a) =
p∑
j=1
ω ja j where ω j > 0 is the weight associated to criterion j, j = 1, . . . , p
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Impacts of veto thresholds.
 v
a  b a (v ∪?v )b
a ? b a ?v b
a ∼ b a (v ∪ −1v ∪ ?v ∪ ∼v )
Example 3. Mechanism MERAPR ,rR , denoted by MERAR , is a MERAU mechanism using a reference point-based function uα ,
which is a monotonically decreasing function deﬁned as follows:
uα(b) = max
j=1,...,p
{
λ j(α j − b j)
}
where α ∈ C speciﬁes the aspiration point of the buyer on the item to be purchased, and λ j , j = 1, . . . , p, is a scaling factor
aiming at normalizing differences expressed on heterogeneous criterion scales.
Example 4. Mechanism MERAPL ,rL , denoted by MERAL , is a mechanism based on the lexicographic order which can be
viewed as a strongly monotonically increasing function. This mechanism is deﬁned by:
• PL , the class of preference relations  such that:
a b ⇔
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a = b or
∃k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, aπ(k) > bπ(k) and
aπ( j) = bπ( j), for j  k − 1
where π denotes a permutation of set {1, . . . , p}.
• rL(), the class of preference relations r such that:
a r b ⇔
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a  b and
∃k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, aπ(k)  bπ(k) + θπ(k) and
aπ( j)  bπ( j), for j  k − 1
where θ ∈Rp+ is an increment vector.
Observe that when the increment vector θ = 0, r coincides with .
4.2. Mechanisms based on veto thresholds
In some situations, the buyer may consider that even if bid a is better than bid b on most criteria, a is so worse than
b on one criterion, say criterion j, that assertion ‘a is preferred to b’ cannot be accepted. In this case criterion j opposes a
veto to the assertion ‘a is preferred to b’. This corresponds to the idea of discordance often used in multiple criteria decision
analysis (see, e.g., [29]). To implement this concept, one needs to deﬁne a veto threshold v j associated to each criterion j
such that a j < b j − v j implies ‘a is not preferred to b’. This leads to the deﬁnition of mechanisms based on veto thresholds.
Deﬁnition 3. From any mechanism MERAP,r , a mechanism MERAPV ,rV is deﬁned by:
• Pv , the class of preference relations v such that
av b ⇔ a b and a j  b j − v j, j = 1, . . . , p
where v = (v1, . . . , vp), v j > 0, j = 1, . . . , p, is a vector of veto thresholds.
• rv(v), the class of request relations rv such that
a rv b ⇔ a r b and a j  b j − v j, j = 1, . . . , p
The asymmetric part of v is deﬁned by:
a v b ⇔ a j  b j − v j, j = 1, . . . , p and
{
a  b or(
a ∼ b and ∃k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, bk < ak − vk
)
The possible impacts of applying veto thresholds to a given relation  in order to obtain a relation v are summarized
in Table 2. Applying veto thresholds to relation  leads to a relation v such that v is not necessarily acyclic. This is
due to the fact that from a ∼ b we can obtain a v b and thus create cycles in v . This impacts on the well-deﬁnedness of
mechanism MERAPV ,rV as follows.
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• Any mechanism MERAPV ,rV is well-deﬁned in asynchronous mode.• Any mechanism MERAPV ,rV is well-deﬁned in synchronous mode if and only if any v ∈PV is acyclic.
Proof. From the above deﬁnitions of v and rv , we have rv ⊂ v . We have also rv ⊂ r , which involves that rv is
acyclic, since r is imposed to be acyclic. Referring to conditions of well-deﬁnedness, presented in Deﬁnition 1, we get the
results for each synchronization mode. 
The following corollary applies this result to the mechanisms previously deﬁned.
Corollary 5. Let MERAΣV , MERARV and MERALV denote mechanisms resulting from applying veto thresholds respectively on mecha-
nism MERAΣ , MERAR and MERAL .
1. Mechanisms MERAΣV and MERARV are not well-deﬁned in synchronous mode.
2. Mechanism PL is well-deﬁned in synchronous mode.
Proof. 1. Consider an item described using three criteria, the weighted sum function uω deﬁned using ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = 1/3,
and the following bids a(10,20,30), b(20,30,10), c(30,10,20). We have a ∼ b, b ∼ c, and a ∼ c. However, when introducing
veto thresholds v1 = v2 = v3 = 15, we get a cycle a v b, b v c, and c v a. The same result is obtained considering the
reference point-based function uα with α = (40,40,40) and λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 1.
2. The symmetric part ∼ of any ∈ PL is restricted to identity on the criterion values. Therefore, we get ∼v =∼ and
v ⊂ . In this case, starting from a transitive and complete relation ∈ PL , we obtain a partial relation v , whose
asymmetric part v is acyclic. 
5. Non-dominance of the winning bid
In multiple criteria decision analysis, a natural requirement is that a decision procedure should select a non-dominated
alternative. In the context of auctions, we need to adapt this requirement by imposing non-dominance of the winning bid
with respect to all bids that could be proposed by the non-winning sellers. However, we do not require that the winning bid
be non-dominated with respect to bids that could be proposed by the winning seller. This leads to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4. A multiple criteria auction satisﬁes non-dominance if and only if the winning bid b∗ proposed by the winning
seller s∗ is non-dominated in B−s∗: ∀b ∈ B−s∗ , ¬(bb∗).
As for eﬃciency, non-dominance cannot be ensured if the auction is stopped prematurely due to the closing time. There-
fore, all propositions and corollaries presented in this section assume that the auction ends naturally. Here again, we will
not state explicitly this assumption for the sake of brevity.
Proposition 8. Algorithm MERA(,r) ensures non-dominance if and only if  ⊂r .
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
The following corollaries are a direct application of the previous result to mechanisms based on an aggregation func-
tion u.
Corollary 6.When function u is strongly monotonic, mechanism MERAU ensures non-dominance if r coincides with , i.e. if ε = 0.
Proof. Since u is strongly monotonic, we have ab implies u(a) > u(b), i.e.  ⊂=r . 
From this corollary, we get that mechanism MERAΣ ensures non-dominance if ε = 0. In the same way, mechanism MERAL
ensures non-dominance if θ = 0.
Corollary 7. If function u is monotonic, but not strongly monotonic, mechanism MERAU does not ensure non-dominance.
Proof. Function u being monotonic, but not strongly monotonic, there exist z, z′ ∈ Rp such that z > z′ and u(z) = u(z′).
Then, there may exist a, b ∈ B such that a j = z j and b j = z′j for 1, . . . , p, and thus such that ab and u(a) = u(b). Therefore
we have ab and ¬(a r b), for any r associated to u. This shows that ¬( ⊂r). 
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From this corollary, we get that mechanism MERAR cannot ensure non-dominance.
However, launching an auction with a step ε = 0 may make the auction too slow to end naturally. As a consequence,
non-dominance may not be satisﬁed. This is why we may consider a weaker form of non-dominance when using strictly
positive auction steps. To this end, we need to allow the winning bid to be dominated, provided that this dominance is not
too strong. This requires to deﬁne a concept of strong dominance. While several deﬁnitions are possible, we suggest the
following deﬁnition of quasi non-dominance which uses a signiﬁcance threshold on each criterion. The corresponding idea of
strong dominance is then that, besides classical strict dominance, we should observe a signiﬁcant improvement on at least
one criterion so as to accept strong dominance.
Deﬁnition 5. Let σ be a vector of p positive signiﬁcance thresholds, an associated strong dominance relation σ (see Fig. 1
in the bicriteria case) is deﬁned by:
aσ b ⇔
{
ab and
∃k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, ak > bk + σk (6)
This concept of strong dominance relation allows us to relax the condition of Deﬁnition 4.
Deﬁnition 6. A multiple criteria auction satisﬁes quasi non-dominance for a given signiﬁcance threshold vector σ , if and only
if the winning bid b∗ proposed by the winning seller s∗ is σ -non-dominated in B−s
∗
: ∀b ∈ B−s∗ , ¬(bσ b∗).
Proposition 9. Algorithm MERA(,r) ensures quasi non-dominance for a given signiﬁcance threshold vector σ , if and only if
σ ⊂r .
Proof. The proof is similar to the one given for Proposition 8 (Appendix A.4) by replacing  by σ . 
Since results on mechanisms based on an aggregation function u depend on the precise deﬁnition of u, the following
corollaries deal with mechanisms based on the weighted sum function, the lexicographic order, and the reference point-
based function, respectively.
Corollary 8.
1. Mechanism MERAΣ ensures quasi non-dominance if we set σ j = ε/ω j , j = 1, . . . , p.
2. Mechanism MERAL ensures quasi non-dominance if we set σ j = θ j , j = 1, . . . , p.
Proof. 1. Consider a,b ∈ B such that aσ b, with σ j = ε/ω j, j = 1, . . . , p. We have a j  b j, j = 1, . . . , p, and there exists
k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, ak > bk + ε/ωk , which implies ∑pj=1 ω ja j >∑pj=1ω jb j + ε, i.e. uω(a) > uω(b) + ε, and thus a r b. This
proves that σ ⊂r .
2. Consider a,b ∈ B such that aσ b, with σ j = θ j, j = 1, . . . , p. We have a j  b j, j = 1, . . . , p, and there exists k ∈
{1, . . . , p}, such that ak > bk + σk . Considering k′ = π−1(k), we get aπ(k′) > bπ(k′) + θπ(k′) and aπ( j)  bπ( j), for j  k′ − 1,
which implies a r b. This proves that σ ⊂r . 
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Proof. We show, for any strong dominance relation σ , the possible existence of a,b ∈ B such that aσ b and uα(a) =
uα(b). Consider for this, bid b(b1,b2) ∈ B , λ1 = λ2 = 1 and the reference point α(b1,b2), there may exists t > σ1 such that
a(b1 + t,b2) ∈ B . We have then aσ b and uα(a) = uα(b) = 0.
Since uα(a) = uα(b), we have ¬(a r b) for any r associated to . Therefore, σ ⊂r is not satisﬁed. 
The use of veto thresholds affects quasi non-dominance in the following way.
Proposition 10. If algorithm MERA(,r) ensures quasi non-dominance for a given signiﬁcance threshold vector σ , algorithm
MERA(v ,rv) also ensures quasi non-dominance for σ :
• in the asynchronous mode,
• in the synchronous mode if v is acyclic.
Proof. We show that σ ⊂r implies σ ⊂rv . Indeed, aσ b implies a j  b j and thus a j  b j − v j , j = 1, . . . , p, which,
together with a r b, imply a rv b. Moreover, in the synchronous mode, we need to impose acyclicity of v in order to get
a well-deﬁned mechanism (see condition 3 of Deﬁnition 1 ). 
The following corollary applies this result on mechanisms MERALV and MERAΣV .
Corollary 10.Mechanism MERALV ensures quasi non-dominance in both synchronization modes and MERAΣV in the asynchronous
mode only.
6. Fair competition between non-dominated bids
In multiple criteria decision analysis, a decision procedure relies on an aggregation model to capture the decision maker’s
preferences and aims to select a preferred alternative among the set of non-dominated alternatives. A decision procedure
satisﬁes fair competition between non-dominated alternatives, if for any non-dominated alternative, there exists at least one
set of values of the aggregation model parameters which enables the procedure to select this alternative or any of its
equivalents, i.e. any alternative with the same criterion values. This is clearly a crucial issue since, if fair competition is not
satisﬁed, potentially interesting alternatives are rejected a priori because of technical limitations of the aggregation model.
In the context of auctions, fair competition should be evaluated between non-dominated bids from the set BS =⋃s∈S Bs
of bids that could be proposed by the competing sellers. We cannot ensure, however, that a given bid will be effectively
proposed during the auction and, thus, will win. Therefore, we need to adapt this property by requiring only that any
non-dominated bid is valid, i.e. liable to be proposed, at any round; moreover if any of its equivalents, including itself, is
proposed then it wins the auction. This leads to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7. Any mechanism MERAP,r satisﬁes fair competition if and only if for any bid a, non-dominated in BS , there
exists at least one preference relation ∈P and one request relation r ∈ r() ensuring that any bid equivalent to bid a is
valid at any round, and wins if proposed.
As observed before, fair competition does not ensure that any bid a, non-dominated in BS , wins any auction MERA(,r ),
where  and r represent the relations associated to a. However, this property ensures that:
• Any auction MERA(,r ), which ends naturally, is won by one of the sellers which owns bid a or one of its equivalents.
• When at least two different sellers own bid a or one of its equivalents, any auction MERA(, r ), which ends naturally,
is won by bid a or one of its equivalents.
Otherwise, in both cases, the current winning bid could be beaten by bid a or one of its equivalents.
We provide now a necessary and suﬃcient condition for fair competition.
Proposition 11. Both for asynchronous and synchronous modes, any mechanism MERAP,r satisﬁes fair competition if and only if the
following condition holds:
∀B, ∀a ∈ B, ∃∈ P, ∃ r ∈ r(), ∀b ∈ B, ¬(ba) ⇒ a r b (7)
Proof. See Appendix A.5. 
The following corollaries apply this result to the mechanisms presented in Section 4.
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satisfy fair competition.
Proof. Let us consider the set of potential bids B = {a, b, c} with criterion values a(40,40), b(100,0) and c(0,100) and let
us show that fair competition cannot be obtained for bid a since condition (7) is violated.
• For all weight vector (ω1,ω2) ∈ [0,1]2 such that ω1 + ω2 = 1, we have uω(a) = 40, uω(b) = 100ω1, and uω(c) =
100 − 100ω1. Then we can check easily that b is optimal when 0.5  ω1  1 and c is optimal when 0  ω1  0.5.
Hence, we have
∀∈ PΣ, ∃b ∈ B, ¬(ba) and ¬(a  b)
and thus ¬(a r b),∀ r ∈ r(), since r ⊂ .
• For any lexicographic order, bid a(40,40) cannot be optimal and thus condition (7) is violated. 
Corollary 12.Mechanism MERAR , using the reference point-based function, satisﬁes fair competition.
Proof. Mechanism MERAR satisﬁes condition (7) for any set of potential bids B and any bid a ∈ B taking α = (a1, . . . ,ap)
as aspiration point and ε = 0 as step of the request. We have indeed, uα(a) = 0 and uα(b) > 0 for any b ∈ B such
that ¬(ba). 
The use of veto thresholds affects fair competition in the following way.
Proposition 12. Considering P a class of preference relations, mechanism MERAPV ,rV , if well-deﬁned, satisﬁes fair competition if
and only if mechanism MERAP,r satisﬁes fair competition.
Proof. Assuming that MERAPV ,rV is well-deﬁned and that MERAP,r satisﬁes fair competition, condition (7) associates to any
a ∈ B a relation ∈P and a relation r ∈ r(). Then condition (7) remains satisﬁed by relations v ∈PV and rv ∈ rv(v)
respectively deﬁned from  and r , using any veto thresholds such that bid a remains comparable to any bid that does not
dominate it. Such thresholds, if chosen large enough, always exist.
Assuming that MERAPV ,rV satisﬁes fair competition, condition (7) associates a relation v ∈PV and a relation rv ∈ rv(v
) to any a ∈ B . Then taking relations  and r underlying respectively v and rv allows us to satisfy condition (7), since
we have rv ⊂ r . 
As a consequence of this proposition, we get:
Corollary 13.Mechanism asynchronous-MERARV , using the reference point-based function and veto thresholds, satisﬁes fair compe-
tition.
Remark 4.
1. When using veto thresholds with the reference point-based function, we must pay attention to setting these thresholds
in such a way that the aspiration point is preferred to any bid that does not dominate it. This is not restrictive since
the concept of aspiration point, by its very deﬁnition, imposes that the only bids that are preferred to it are the ones
which dominate it.
2. As shown in Section 4, mechanism MERARV cannot be used in the synchronous mode, since veto thresholds may
introduce cycles into relations deﬁned from the reference point-based function.
7. Hybrid mechanisms
As shown in the previous section, standard aggregation models satisfy either quasi non-dominance or fair competition.
In order to satisfy both properties, it is natural to try to combine models of each type. To deﬁne such a combination, it
should be pointed out that aggregation models satisfying fair competition but not quasi non-dominance are able to return
all non-dominated bids but also dominated ones. More precisely, provided that such a model corresponds to a monotonic
function, which is usually the case, the only situation where dominated bids are returned is when there also exists at
least one non-dominated bid achieving the same optimal value on the function. Conversely, aggregation models satisfying
quasi non-dominance but not fair competition only return non-dominated bids but may miss some of them. Therefore, the
only possible combination consists in using ﬁrst a model satisfying fair competition and, in case of multiple candidate bids,
ﬁltering them using a model satisfying quasi non-dominance.
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne such a hybrid mechanism. Then, we present a detailed illustrative example of an auction
process using this mechanism.
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Value functions.
Car type
Value hatchback convertible roadster SUV coupé sedan large SUV large sedan
Score 20 40 40 60 60 80 80 100
Car color
Value white yellow blue grey red purple black green
Score 40 40 60 60 80 80 100 100
7.1. Mechanism MERARLV
Mechanism MERARLV is a hybrid mechanism with veto thresholds which uses the reference point-based function as the
main aggregation model and resolves ties with the lexicographic model. It is deﬁned with:
• PRLV , the class of preference relations v such that
av b ⇔
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a j  b j − v j, j = 1, . . . , p and (
uα(a) < uα(b) or
(uα(a) = uα(b) and (a = b or (∃k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, aπ(k) > bπ(k) and
aπ( j) = bπ( j), for j  k − 1))))
• rRLV (), the class of request relations rv such that
a rv b ⇔
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a v b and (
uα(a) uα(b) − ε or
(uα(b) − ε < uα(a) uα(b) and
∃k ∈ {1, . . . , p},aπ(k)  bπ(k) + θπ(k) and aπ( j)  bπ( j), for j  k − 1))
where ε  0 is a decrement on uα and θ ∈Rp+ an increment vector on the criterion values.
Observe that when we have ε = 0 and θ j = 0, j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, relation rv coincides with v .
Moreover, the use of the lexicographic order in the preference relation, even at the second place, prevents cycles in
the asymmetric part, v , of any preference relation v ∈ PRLV . Therefore mechanism MERARLV is well-deﬁned in both
synchronization modes. Finally, mechanism MERARLV ensures quasi non-dominance from Corollary 8 and Proposition 10, and
fair competition from Corollary 12 and Proposition 12.
7.2. The auction context
The auction context is a synchronous auction, where one buyer agent negotiates with three sellers s1, s2, and s3 over
a car, described by three attributes: price, type, and color. The set of potential bids for each seller is given in Table 5,
Appendix B. Before starting the auction, the buyer deﬁnes his/her preference relation on the item to be purchased as follows:
• Each attribute is encoded so as to reﬂect preferences on the corresponding viewpoint. This gives rise to the three
criterion functions: price, type, and color. For the sake of simplicity, we use a linear transformation for the criterion
price:
b1 =
(
50000− price(b))/(50000− 10000) × 100.
Moreover, for the attribute type, the buyer expresses the following preferences:
large sedan  large SUV  sedan  SUV ∼ coupé  convertible ∼ roadster  hatchback which are encoded in Table 3.
For the attribute color, the buyer expresses the following preferences:
green ∼ black  purple ∼ red  blue ∼ grey  yellow ∼ white which are encoded in Table 3.
This way, we deﬁne criterion functions to be maximized and taking values in [0,100].
• α = (65,60,60), the aspiration point;
• λ = (1,1,1), the vector of scaling factors;
• (price, type, color), the lexicographic order of the criteria;
• v = (40,45,45), the vector of veto thresholds;
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Auction process.
i Current constraint ci s1 s2 s3
1 (∗)
(34000, large sedan, purple)
(40,100,80)
uα(bs1,1) = 25
(41000, coupé, purple)
(23,60,80)
uα(bs2,1) = 42
(30000, hatchback, blue)
(50,20,60)
uα(bs3,1) = 40
2 (b2  55 and b3  35) and
(uα(b) 20 or
(20< uα(b) 25 and
(b1  45 or
(b1  40 and b2  100 and b3  85))))
current winner (∗)
(32000, coupé, green)
(45,60,100)
uα(bs2,2) = 20
(13500, coupé, yellow)
(91,60,40)
uα(bs3,2) = 20
3 (b1  5 and b2  15 and b3  55) and
(uα(b) 15 or
(15< uα(b) 20 and
(b1  50 or
(b1  45 and b2  65))))
(∗)
(21000, roadster, grey)
(73,40,60)
uα(bs1,3) = 20
current winner
(21000, convertible, blue)
(73,40,60)
uα(bs3,3) = 20
4 (b1  33 and b3  15) and
(uα(b) 15 or
(15< uα(b) 20 and
(b1  78 or
(b1  73 and b2  45) or
(b1  73 and b2  40 and b3  65))))
current winner (∗)
(28000, sedan, grey)
(55,80,60)
uα(bs2,4) = 10
(13500, coupé, yellow)
(91,60,40)
uα(bs3,4) = 20
5 (b1  10 and b2  35 and b3  15) and
(uα(b) 5 or
(5< uα(b) 10 and
(b1  60 or
(b1  55 and b2  85) or
(b1  55 and b2  80 and b3  65))))
no bid current winner (∗)
(22000, large SUV, blue)
(70,80,60)
uα(bs3,5) = 0
6 (b1  30) and b2  35 and b3  15 and
(uα(b)−5 or
−5< uα(b) 0 and
(b1  75 or
(b1  70 and b2  85) or
(b1  70 and b2  80 and b3  65)))
no bid no bid current winner
Observe that, we have b j  100 for any potential bid b and α j + v j > 100, j = 1, . . . , p. Thus, as required in Remark 4,
the aspiration point α is preferred to any bid that does not dominate it. Therefore, it is liable to win at any round, if it is
non-dominated in Bs
1 ∪ Bs2 ∪ Bs3 .
The buyer deﬁnes his/her request relation by setting:
• ε = 5, the increment on uα ;
• θ = (5,5,5), the increment vector on the criterion values for the lexicographic aggregation function.
At the beginning of the auction, the buyer agent indicates to the sellers the criterion functions, the aspiration point and
the criterion order. Then, each seller identiﬁes his/her proposals that match the item to be purchased.
7.3. The auction process
The auction takes place in 6 rounds reported in Table 4. At the ﬁrst round, each seller provides a bid that satisﬁes
the initial requirement. Since we have bs
1,1 v bs2,1 and bs1,1 v bs3,1, M(v , P1) = {bs1,1} and bid bs1,1 is selected as the
current best bid. Its corresponding seller s1 becomes the current winner and is not called upon at the next round. The
current constraint c1 (described in Table 4), asking for bids that are rv -preferred to bs1,1, is sent to sellers s2 and s3.
At round 2, bs
2,2 and bs
3,2 are incomparable. Indeed, we have bs
3,2  bs2,2 (the same value on uα , but a better value
of bs
3,2 on price), but the third criterion opposes a veto to bs
3,2 v bs2,2 since bs3,23 = 40 < bs
2,2
3 − v3 = 100 − 45. Thus,
M(, P2) = {bs2,2,bs3,2}. We assume that bid bs2,2 is arbitrary selected as the current best bid.
At round 3, since bid bs
1,3 and bs
3,3 are equivalent, we have M(, P3) = {bs1,3,bs3,3}. We assume that bid bs1,3 is
arbitrary selected as the current best bid.
At round 4, seller s3 is able to propose the same bid as at round 2. Since we have bs
2,4 v bs3,4, M(, P3) = {bs2,4} and
bid bs
2,4 is selected as the current best bid.
At round 5, seller s1 cannot propose a valid bid. Thus, we have M(, P3) = {bs3,5} and bid bs3,5 is selected as the current
best bid. At round 6, sellers s1 and s2 cannot propose a valid bid. Thus, bid bs
3,5 = (70,80,60) becomes the winning bid.
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with two attributes, type and price, which are over his/her aspirations.
It is interesting to observe the evolution of the auction and the properties that are satisﬁed.
• [MBB] is not satisﬁed. Indeed, we have best3 = bs1,3 and bs3,2 v best3. Thus, best3 is not a maximal element among
the set of bids previously received.
• [IBB] is not satisﬁed. Indeed, we have best1 = bs1,1 and best1 ? best3. Thus, best3 is not preferred to best1.
• [NCB] is not satisﬁed, since seller s3 has proposed the same bid twice, ﬁrst at round 2 and second at round 4.
Even if this evolution does not respect any of the ‘natural’ properties [MBB], [IBB], and [NCB], the ﬁnal result of the
auction is satisfactory. Indeed, as expected, the auction is quasi eﬃcient. First, none of the non-winning sellers can propose a
bid which is r-preferred to the winning bid. Second, observing from Table 5, Appendix B, that seller s3 owns the potential
bid (65,80,80), which is r-preferred to any potential bid of sellers s1 and s2, he/she should win any auction. Indeed, seller
s3 does win the auction described in Table 4. Observe ﬁnally that quasi non-dominance is satisﬁed since the winning bid
bs
3,5 is non-dominated in B−s3 .
8. Conclusions
This paper proposed a study of English reverse auction mechanisms in a uniﬁed framework by considering that the
buyer’s preferences are represented by a binary preference relation. Existing mechanisms are based on a single or multidi-
mensional utility function, which corresponds to a transitive and complete preference relation. One of our main goals in this
study was to allow for more general preference relations, relaxing transitivity and completeness, in order to be able to model
more elaborate and more realistic preferences. On the other hand, the necessity of integrating preferences within an auction
mechanism which should respect some properties imposes restrictions on the preference relations. After precisely deﬁning
such properties and providing minimal conditions on the preference relations so as to satisfy these properties, it appears
that the main restriction is acyclicity of the request relation or of the asymmetric part of the preference relation. Moreover,
we showed that quasi eﬃciency is satisﬁed with no additional restriction on the preference relations. This leaves room for
interesting preference models that accept intransitivity and incomparability. In particular, when considering auction mecha-
nisms based on multiple criteria, we showed that aggregation models including veto thresholds can be implemented while
preserving properties related to non-dominance and fair competition. Regarding these two basic properties, we pointed out
that classical multiple criteria auction mechanisms usually satisfy one of them, but not both of them. We showed, however,
how to satisfy both properties by using hybrid aggregation models.
Even if our framework is devoted to the reverse version of the English protocol, it can be adapted to other protocols. This
is particularly easy for one-round protocols. Indeed, we only need a simpliﬁed version of our framework, without deﬁning
a request function. In ﬁrst-preferred auctions, which would generalize ﬁrst-price auctions, the winning seller must provide
an item corresponding to the winning bid. In second-preferred auctions, which would generalize second-price or Vickrey
auctions, the winning seller only has to provide an item corresponding to the second most preferred bid. In this case, we
need to redeﬁne concepts and properties using only the preference relation. On the contrary, adapting our framework to
the reverse Dutch protocol would require focusing on the request function whereas the select function would not play any
part. In this case, indeed, we need to deﬁne a scheme of less and less demanding constraints until the ﬁrst seller who
proposes a bid wins the auction. For all these protocols, it would be interesting to investigate conditions for eﬃciency, bid
non-dominance, and fair competition.
Our framework can be deemed as the ﬁrst milestone to providing an agent-based auction system where an autonomous
buyer agent conducts auctions on behalf of a buyer and communicates with several autonomous seller agents that bid for
selling an item on behalf of sellers. Thus, providing a framework which helps designing such seller agents would be a useful
complementary research work. The three main tasks on the research agenda would be:
• modeling of the seller’s preferences on items he/she sells using binary preference relations,
• automated deﬁnition of the bids taking into account requests from the buyer agent, seller’s preferences and strategy,
• deﬁnition of desirable properties for the sellers and study of the conditions to achieve these properties.
Finally, integrating more elaborate preference models in more complex types of auctions, such as multi-item, double, or
combinatorial auctions, would be a challenging research project.
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 3
[IBB] ⇒ [MBB]. We have P i = {best1, . . . , besti} for i  1. Thus, assuming [IBB], we have besti  best j , for i  2 and j < i.
So we get M(, P i) = {besti} and [MBB] is satisﬁed.
[NCB] is satisﬁed since relation r is imposed to be acyclic.
M.-J. Bellosta et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1449–1467 1465A.2. Proof of Proposition 4
1. The condition is suﬃcient. We have best j+1 r best j , for i  2 and j = 1, . . . , i − 1, due to the request constraints. This
implies, according to (1), that ¬(best j  besti), for i  2 and j = 1, . . . , i − 1. Thus, we have besti ∈ M(, P i), for i  2.
Moreover, for i = 1, we have trivially best1 ∈ M(, P1).
The condition is necessary. Let us assume by contradiction that (1) is false:
∃n 3,∃b1, . . . ,bn ∈ B, b j+1 r b j, j = 1, . . . ,n − 1, and b1  bn
We show now the existence of an auction which does not satisfy [MBB]. Consider for this, n sellers s j with b j ∈ Bs j ,
j = 1, . . . ,n. At round j, seller s j proposes b j , j = 1, . . . ,n. This sequence of bids is valid, since it satisﬁes the request
constraint at each round. Observe, however, that Pn = {b1, . . . ,bn} and bestn = bn /∈ M(, Pn), since b1  bn .
2. The condition is suﬃcient. We have best j+1 r best j for i  2 and j = 1, . . . , i − 1, due to the request constraints. This
implies, according to (2), that besti  best j for i  2 and j = 1, . . . , i − 1. Thus, [IBB] is satisﬁed.
The condition is necessary. Let us assume by contradiction that (2) is false:
∃n 3, ∃b1, . . . ,bn ∈ B, b j+1 r b j, j = 1, . . . ,n − 1, and ¬
(
bn  b1)
We show now the existence of a PERA auction which does not satisfy [IBB].
Consider for this, n − 1 sellers s j with b1,bn ∈ Bs1 and b j ∈ Bs j , j = 2, . . . ,n − 1. At round j, seller s j proposes b j ,
j = 1, . . . ,n − 1. Then, at round n, s1 proposes bn . Observe that we have b1 = best1, bn = bestn , and ¬(bn  b1).
A.3. Proof of Proposition 5
1. The condition is suﬃcient. For any a ∈ P i , there exists k i, such that a ∈ Pk . We have ¬(a  bestk) due to the selection
of bestk from Pk . Moreover we have best j+1 r best j for j = k, . . . , i − 1 due to the request constraints. Using (3), we
get ¬(a  besti) and thus besti ∈ M(, P i). Moreover, for i = 1, we have trivially best1 ∈ M(, P1).
The condition is necessary. Let us assume by contradiction that (3) is false:
∃n 2, ∃a,b1, . . . ,bn ∈ B, ¬(a  b1) and b j+1 r b j, j = 1, . . . ,n − 1, and a  bn
We show now the existence of a synchronous PERA auction which does not satisfy [MBB]. Consider n sellers s j with
Bs
j
= {a,b1, . . . , bn}, j = 1, . . . ,n. The auction starts with s1 proposing b1 and the other sellers proposing a. Assume that
bid b1 is selected. At round i, i = 2, . . . ,n, all sellers except seller si−1 propose bi . Assume that bid bi is accepted as besti
for seller si . Thus, we have Pn = {a,b1, . . . ,bn} with b j = best j , j = 1, . . . ,n. Since a  bestn , we get bestn /∈ M(, Pn).
2. The condition is suﬃcient. We have best j+1 r best j for i  2 and j = 1, . . . , i − 1, due to the request constraint. This
implies, according to (4), that besti  best j for i  2 and j = 1, . . . , i − 1.
The condition is necessary. Let us assume by contradiction that (4) is false:
∃n 3, ∃b1, . . . ,bn ∈ B, b j+1 r b j, j = 1, . . . ,n − 1, and ¬
(
bn  b1)
Consider n sellers s j with Bs
j
= {b1, . . . , bn}, j = 1, . . . ,n. The auction starts with all the sellers proposing b1. Assume
that bid b1 is selected from seller s1. At round i, i = 2, . . . ,n, all sellers except seller si−1 propose bi . Assume that bid bi
is accepted as besti for seller si . For this auction, ¬(bn  b1) corresponds to ¬(bestn  best1). Thus [IBB] is not satisﬁed.
3. The condition is suﬃcient. For any a ∈ P i−1, there exists k  i − 1, such that a ∈ Pk . We have ¬(a  bestk) due to
the selection of bestk from Pk . Moreover we have best j+1 r best j for j = k, . . . , i − 1 due to the request constraints.
Using (5), we get ¬(a r besti) for any a ∈ P i−1 and thus P i ∩ P i−1 = ∅.
The condition is necessary. Let us assume by contradiction that (5) is false:
∃n 2, ∃a,b1, . . . ,bn ∈ B, ¬(a  b1) and b j+1 r b j, j = 1, . . . ,n − 1, and a r bn
We show now the existence of a synchronous PERA auction which does not satisfy [MBB]. Consider n sellers s j with
Bs
j = {a,b1, . . . ,bn}, j = 1, . . . ,n. The auction starts with s1 proposing b1 and the other sellers proposing a. Assume
that bid b1 is selected. At round i all sellers except seller si−1 propose bid bi . Assume that bid bi is accepted as besti
for seller si , i = 2, . . . ,n. Since a r bn , all sellers except seller sn propose bid a at round n+ 1. Observe that a has been
proposed at rounds 1 and n + 1, and thus [NCB] is not satisﬁed.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The condition is suﬃcient. Indeed, consider an auction running according to Algorithm MERA(,r). The assumption
of natural end implies that for all b ∈ B−s∗ , we have ¬(b r b∗) and thus ¬(bb∗).
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such that ab and ¬(a r b). Consider now two sellers s and s′ with Bs = Bs′ = {a,b} and the following asynchronous and
synchronous auctions. At the ﬁrst round, sellers s proposes bid b (asynchronous auction) or sellers s and s′ propose bid b
which is selected from s (synchronous auction). At the second round, seller s′ cannot propose any bid. Thus, seller s wins
the auction with bid b which is dominated in B−s . 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. The condition is suﬃcient. Consider any bid a ∈ Bs non-dominated in Bs and relations  and r associated to a
by (7). Let Equ(a) denote the set of bids containing a and its equivalents. Considering any bid b ∈ Bs \ Equ(a), we have
¬(ba′), for any a′ ∈ Equ(a). This implies that a′ r b, ensuring the validity of any bid a′ equivalent to a, at any round and
for any mode. Moreover, asymmetry of r and the inclusion r ⊂  imply respectively ¬(b r a′) and a′  b, showing that
any bid a′ equivalent to a wins if proposed in any mode.
The condition is necessary. Let us consider a mechanism MERAP,r that does not satisfy (7), i.e. such that:
∃B, ∃a ∈ B, ∀∈ P, ∀ r ∈ r(), ∃b ∈ B, ¬(ba) and ¬(a r b) (A.1)
Let us consider bid a deﬁned by (A.1), any ∈ P , any r ∈ r() and two sellers s and s′ such that Bs = {a,b} and
Bs
′ = {b}, where bid b satisﬁes (A.1). Let us assume that at the ﬁrst round of an asynchronous auction seller s′ proposes
bid b and that at the ﬁrst round of a synchronous auction, sellers s and s′ propose bid b which is selected from s′ .
In both cases, bid a is not valid at the second round, since we have ¬(a r b) from (A.1). Seller s′ wins the auction
with bid b. Bid a, which is non-dominated by any bid in Bs , is not capable of winning when bid b is proposed at the ﬁrst
round. 
Appendix B. Seller’s potential bids
Table 5
Sellers’ potential bids described on attribute, criterion, and aggregation values. Each bid has a price between the reserve
price and the catalog price. uα is computed with α = (60,60,65).
Seller s1
bid criterion values uα
([13500, 15000], hatchback, yellow) ([88, 91], 20, 40) 40
([25000, 27000], hatchback, blue) ([58, 63], 20, 60) 40
([34000, 35500], hatchback, red) ([36, 40], 20, 80) 40
([38500, 40000], hatchback, black) ([25, 29], 20, 100) 40
([18000, 19500], convertible, yellow) ([76, 80], 40, 40) 20
([20000, 21500], roadster, grey) ([71, 75], 40, 60) 20
([30000, 31500], coupé, grey) ([46, 50] , 60, 60) [15, 19]
([13000, 14500], convertible, yellow) ([89, 93], 40, 40) 20
([32500, 34000], large sedan, purple) ([40, 44], 100, 80) [21, 25]
Seller s2
bid criterion values uα
([13000, 15000], convertible, white) ([88, 93], 40, 40) 20
([20000, 22000], convertible, blue) ([70, 75], 40, 60) 20
([30000, 32000], convertible, green) ([45, 50], 40, 100) 20
([29000, 31000], roadster, black) ([53, 48], 40, 100) 20
([16000, 18000], SUV, yellow) ([80, 85], 60, 40) 20
([29000, 31000], SUV, grey) ([48, 53], 60, 60) [12, 17]
([40000, 42000], coupé, purple) ([20, 25], 60, 80) [40, 45]
([31000, 33000], coupé, green) ([43, 48], 60, 100) [17, 22]
([25000, 27000], large sedan, yellow) ([58, 63], 100, 40) 20
([26000, 28000], sedan, grey) ([55, 60], 80, 60) [5,10]
([24000, 26000], large SUV, red) ([60, 65], 80, 80) [0, 5]
Seller s3
bid= (price, type, color) criterion values uα
([11500, 13500], coupé, yellow) ([91, 96], 60, 40) 20
([30000, 32000], SUV, blue) ([45, 50], 60, 60) [15, 20]
([38000, 40000], coupé, red) ([35, 40], 60, 80) [25, 30]
([20000, 22000], large SUV, blue) ([70, 75], 80, 60) 0
([22000, 24000], sedan, purple) ([65, 70], 80, 80) [−5, 0]
([19500, 21000], sedan, grey) ([73, 76], 80, 60) 0
([28000, 30000], hatchback, yellow) ([50, 55], 20, 40) 40
([34000, 36000], large sedan, purple) ([35, 40], 100, 80) [25,30]
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